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NCAA INITIAL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:
THE CASE LAW BEHIND THE CHANGES
Doug Bakker'
INTRODUCTION
One aspect of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") mission has been
to raise student-athlete graduation rates, so these students are educated, not exploited, by the
colleges and universities around the country. The NCAA has addressed this issue through the
use of initial-eligibility rules and has attempted to change the bylaws to correspond with the
changing needs of its member institutions and the student-athletes. However, another contention
is that the NCAA has been affected by civil litigation and in accordance has changed the
eligibility rules with the enactment of Proposition 16 and especially the new expansive bylaw
changes that will become effective in August of 2005.
Before analyzing this issue, the core characteristics of the NCAA and the lawsuits that
follow from them need to be examined. Initial eligibility requirements set by the NCAA for
student-athletes are a hotly litigated area. There have been many claims filed in the courts since
the enactment of Proposition 48 in 1995 seeking injunctive relief regarding the initial eligibility
of many non-qualifiers or partial qualifiers. 2 The claims have varied throughout litigation and
have rested on various statutes and widely used precedent for support, including Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Welsh v. Boy
Scouts ofAmerica.3
SJ.D., Depaul University College of Law, 2005.
2 Some of the cases that have been fully litigated since 1995 are Cureton v. NCAA, Hall v. NCAA, Ganden v.
NCAA, Tatum v. NCAA, Cole v. NCAA, Pryor v. NCAA.
42 U.S.C. § 200d (1964), 42 U.S.C. 12101 (1990), and Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.3d 1267 (1993).
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Some claims are made by student-athletes with learning disabilities seeking initial
eligibility despite falling well below the initial eligibility requirements.4 Others seek relief
through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging discrimination by the NCAA regarding
the eligibility bylaws. Also, some claims attempt to assert that there is a valid contract between
the NCAA and the student-athlete with the signature of the National Letter of Intent and that the
NCAA violates this contractual agreement by not granting them their eligibility. Each of these
types of claims will be analyzed in further detail.
All of these claims rest on a few core characteristics of the NCAA that courts have
established through a series of opinions. These characteristics are a common thread throughout
many of the cases and are most often the deciding factors in the opinions. In order to fully
understand the evolution of the litigation against the initial eligibility rules of the NCAA, these
essential elements must be flushed out. From there, it is necessary to analyze the eligibility
bylaws of the NCAA and the validity of the various claims that arose throughout the last four
decades, dating back to the 1.600 rule, the eligibility requirement before the enactment of
Proposition 48. The 1.600 rule involved a complex formula adopted by the NCAA that used
standardized test scores and high school GPAs. The formula attempted to project whether the
student-athlete would receive a 1.600 GPA in the student's first year in college. It was later
replaced by Proposition 48, which required a minimum 2.00 GPA in 11 core high school classes
and a minimum SAT score of 700 in order to be able to receive a scholarship in their first year of
collegiate enrollment. This type of eligibility requirement became the basis of the rules we have
today.
4 See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17368 at 29
(1996); Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
See Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. La. 1973); Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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II. CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NCAA
The Court has addressed the following core characteristics numerous times in regard to
the NCAA: whether the NCAA is a voluntary association of colleges and universities; whether
the NCAA is a "state actor;" whether the NCAA is a place of public accommodation; whether a
college education and interscholastic athletic competition are protected rights; and whether the
NCAA performs a legitimate interest. At the basis of every lawsuit one or more of the above
characteristics of the NCAA is being discussed and becomes the foundation of the rationale in
the majority opinion.
A. Is the NCAA a Voluntary Association?
Many of us think of the NCAA as the end-all-be-all of the administration of college
athletics. However, this is a misconception, as there are alternative intercollegiate associations,
such as the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics ("NAIA") and the United States
Collegiate Athletic Association ("USCAA"). It has been argued that the NCAA is not voluntary
because for many schools there is no viable alternative for an expansive sports program that they
are expected to maintain.6 Several cases have addressed the voluntary aspect of the NCAA. In
Shelton v. NCAA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "it is not judicial business to tell a
voluntary athletic association how best to formulate or enforce its rules."7 Shelton is the first
decision in which the courts refer to the NCAA as a "voluntary association."8 Over a decade
later, the Supreme Court analyzed this same issue in NCAA v. Tarkanian.9 The Court determined
that the University of Nevada-Las Vegas ("UNLV") had options and could have retained their
6 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988). Tarkanian argued that there was no reasonable alternative
association in which a large university could be associated with in order to support a viable athletics program.
7 Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9 th Cir. 1976). This case was a case involving a student who signed an
invalid contract to play a professional sport (same one he would have played in college). He attempted to gain his
eligibility back by citing a violation of the equal protection clause.
8 Id.
9 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198.
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head basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian, and risked additional sanctions by the NCAA, or "it
could have withdrawn voluntarily from the Association."' 0 Tarkanian attempted to persuade the
court that the power of the NCAA over collegiate athletics is too great and that there is no
practical alternative. The Court addressed this argument and believed it was erroneous, but
recognized in a footnote that "the university's desire to remain a powerhouse among the nation's
men's college basketball teams is understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously
would thwart that goal."" However, the Supreme Court also noted in the same footnote, "that
UNLV's options were unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent."12 Therefore, the
Supreme Court has determined that the NCAA is a voluntary association even though other
options may not be acceptable for certain programs. The Supreme Court has not addressed this
issue since the Tarkanian case, but in an appellate court case in 1999, Tarkanian was followed.
In Cureton v. NCAA, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressly referred to the language of the
opinion and the footnote in Tarkanian.13 The Appellate Court stated in further support of the
decision:
The ultimate decision as to which freshman an institution will permit to
participate in varsity intercollegiate athletics and which applicants will be
awarded athletic scholarships belongs to the member schools. The fact that the
institutions make these decisions cognizant of NCAA sanctions does not mean
that the NCAA controls them, because they have the option, albeit unpalatable, of
risking sanctions or voluntarily withdrawing from the NCAA.14
'
0 Id. This case involved the UINLV coach and the sanctions administered by the NCAA for various violations and
the threat of additional violations if Tarkanian was not fired. Tarkanian argued that his due process right was
violated according § 1983.
" Id. at 199.
12 Id. at 199.
" Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 117 (3 rd Cir. 1999). This case involves student-athletes who standardized test
scores were too low to satisfy NCAA requirements and the plaintiffs allege that the regulations had a disparate
impact on students of color, relying on Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964.
14 [d
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There is no Court of Appeals or Supreme Court case law holding that the NCAA is not a
voluntary association in which the member institutions may not leave at any time." This
strongly court-supported aspect of the NCAA is an important characteristic of eligibility
litigation that the courts have presided over.
B. Is the NCAA a State Actor?
Another important characteristic evaluated by the courts is whether the NCAA is
federally funded and therefore constitutes a state actor. Courts have universally held that that the
NCAA does not constitute a state actor.16 There are a few exceptions, which will be addressed
below, that were reviewed by the courts when addressing a motion for summary judgment,
where the evidence must be looked at in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.' 7 The
determination that the NCAA is not a state actor is an important factor in Title VI cases of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 1983 violations, which will be discussed in depth later.
Once again, Tarkanian v. NCAA is the leading Supreme Court precedent on this issue. In
state action cases, the plaintiff must prove that the State was sufficiently involved to treat the
decisive conduct as state action. This may occur if the State creates the legal framework
governing the conduct18 or if it delegates its authority to a private actor.19 In his case, Tarkanian
attempted to show that the NCAA was a state-actor when it imposed sanctions on UNLV for
violating NCAA rules and told UNLV that it should suspend Tarkanian, or risk additional
sanctions being imposed upon UNLV as a whole. The Court stated that "the source of the
legislations adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada but the collective membership, speaking
15 Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (1999). In this district court case, the court ruled that the member
institutions have a direct connection with the NCAA and therefore implied that the NCAA was not a voluntary
association. This was overruled by the Court of Appeals on review.
1 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988).
1 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 255, 259 (1986).
18 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
19 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
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through an organization that is independent of any particular State," and therefore the State did
not create the legal framework of the NCAA. 20 Tarkanian also argued that since UNLV, a state-
actor, delegated authority to the NCAA it would thereby make the NCAA a state-actor. 21 The
Court rejected this argument and stated that UNLV did not delegate any power to the NCAA to
terminate an employee, but rather the University agreed to adhere to the enforcement provisions
of the Association in order to be a member.22 The Court went on to note that in most cases, the
NCAA is antagonistic to the State and the university it supports in disputes, such as sanctions
and eligibility, and therefore appropriately acts more like a private actor than a state actor.23 This
holding has been extended in subsequent NCAA cases. In Hall v. NCAA, the Northern Illinois
Federal District Court cited Tarkanian v. NCAA, stating that the NCAA is not a state actor.24
The Hall case goes beyond Tarkanian to explain why in their present case the argument that the
NCAA is a state actor through a vague connection of a public university receiving state funding
is even less of an issue. "If the NCAA's relationship with UNLV, a public university, was
insufficient to translate the NCAA's actions into state action, then the NCAA is clearly not a
state actor by virtue of its relationship with Bradley, a private university." 25
With the formation of the National Youth Sports Program Fund ("NYSP") in 1969 by the
NCAA, the landscape of determining whether the NCAA is a state actor changed. The NYSP is
an enrichment program for economically disadvantaged youths that provides summer education
20 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193.
21 Id. at 195.
22 Id. at 196.
23 Id.
24 Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1997). This case involved a student-athlete who failed to satisfy
the eligibility requirements of the NCAA in order to be a qualifier. The plaintiff accused the NCAA of a myriad of
violations, including contractual claims, negligent misrepresentation, promissory etoppel, violation of§ 1981 of
Civil Rights Act of 1886, a violation of Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a violation of §1983.
25 Id.
165
and sports instruction on the campuses of NCAA member and non-member institutions.26 The
NYSP receives federal funds directly from the federal government and therefore is a state
actor.27 In Cureton v. NCAA, Cureton argued that because of the attachment of the NYSP to the
NCAA, the NCAA should be considered a state actor for all legal claims against it, including
§ 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claims. 2 8 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania accepted the argument and stated that since NYSP is ultimately controlled by the
NCAA and, "the NCAA is deemed a recipient of federal funds under this theory, [and] all of its
operations, including its promulgation of initial eligibility rules, are covered by Title VI,"
thereby defining the NCAA as a state actor.29 However, this ruling by the District Court was
made at the summary judgment stage, where evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party. 30 This ruling was overturned less than a year later in the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. 31 The Court responded by stating that the regulations imposed by statutes
regarding state action are program-specific. 32 The Court then proceeded to formulate a bright-
line rule that states: "it is obvious that a recipient of federal financial assistance need not give an
assurance of nondiscrimination with respect to programs in no way affecting the federally
assisted program." 33 Therefore, once again the NCAA is deemed not to be a state actor in all of
its operations, except in the administration of the NYSP. Despite this decision in favor of the
NCAA regarding the connection of the NYSP, the NCAA recognized the potential harm that this
connection could cause them if a court viewed the relationship differently. Therefore, in 2001,
the NCAA separated the NYSP administratively and operationally, instead just providing
26 National Youth Sports Corporation (2006), http://www.nyscorp.org.
27 Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 695.
30 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 255 (1986).
31 Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999).
32 Id. at 115.
33 Id.
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financial grant money and other forms of support, in order to adequately separate them from
future litigation attempting to prove that the NCAA is a state actor.34
In addition, plaintiffs have argued that the NCAA, by virtue of its receipt of membership
dues from publicly financed universities, is a state actor.35 The courts have consistently rejected
this theory and have consistently held that the NCAA is a private actor subject to no federal
funds.
C. Is the NCAA a Place ofPublic Accommodation?
While the NCAA is not considered a state actor by the courts, that does not necessarily mean that
they may not constitute a place of public accommodation. This factor becomes an
important one to resolve in Title III Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claims. In
Ganden v. NCAA, the petitioner had a learning disability and was unable to meet the minimum
eligibility requirements for his GPA in core classes and therefore was determined to be a partial-
qualifier. He alleged discrimination based upon his disability and therefore needed to establish
that the NCAA is a place of public accommodation in order to have a successful ADA claim. In
Ganden, the Northern Illinois Federal District Court analyzed what constitutes a "place of public
accommodation." 36 The Court cited Welsh v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, which stated that a
membership organization must have "a close connection to a particular facility," and that the
connection exists if the organization is affiliated with a particular facility, and membership in the
organization acts as a necessary predicate to use of that facility. 37 The plaintiff argued that the
members of the NCAA primarily construct athletics facilities for the purpose of intercollegiate
athletics and that the NCAA possesses a significant degree of control over the management of
34 Gary T. Brown, NYSP Walks Tall, Stands Tall, NCAA NEWS, March 26, 2001.
3 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988); Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
36 Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17368 at 29 (1996).
37 Id at 29. citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
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the competitions and the use of the facilities. 38 The Court agreed with Ganden and went on to
note that the NCAA most likely "operates" the facilities as well. 39 This use of the word
"operates" is directly stated in the definition of "public accommodation" used by the ADA and
therefore allowed the Court to arrive at the simple conclusion that the NCAA constitutes a place
of public accommodation. 40 The Ganden opinion is not the only one supporting this belief. In
Tatum v. NCAA, the Eastern District Court of Missouri cites to Ganden v. NCAA, laying out the
rule expressed in Welsh v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica and follows precedent.41 In the Tatum case,
the student-athlete was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and took the ACT in a
nonstandard format. The NCAA would not recognize the student's scores and therefore declared
him ineligible. The petitioner claimed discrimination under Title III of the ADA, but the Court
determined that he did not have a significant amount of mental impairment to meet the required
showing under the statue. However, the Court went on to hold that the significant degree of
control that the NCAA exerts over the athletic facilities of its member institutions and other
circumstances, including relevant case law, all support the fact that the NCAA is considered a
place of public accommodation. 42
The two previous cases discussed that determined that the NCAA was a place of public
accommodation were opinions of Federal District Courts; there has yet to be a strong Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court opinion that addresses the NCAA's status as a place of public
accommodation. The two District Courts based their opinions on that of Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc.43 In this case, Casey Martin suffers from a circulatory disorder in which he is unable to
1d. at 32.
9 [d.
40 42 U.S.C. §12181(7).
41 Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
42 Id. at 1121.
43 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2000).
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walk the length of a golf course without possibly causing serious permanent harm to his leg and
at times can not walk the golf course at all. He petitioned the court to order the PGA Tour to
allow him to use a golf cart in all PGA events. He filed a Title III ADA claim stating that they
discriminated against him based on his disability. Many similarities can be found between the
NCAA and the PGA Tour as associations with a wide variety of members and activities that they
administer, govern, and control. In the appellate opinion of Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals cited to Ganden v. NCAA and Tatum v. NCAA stating that in a Title III
case, the definition of a "place of public accommodation" applies not only to the stands, but also
to the playing field. 44 When the PGA tour appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit and stated that "the definition of a 'place of exhibition or entertainment', as a
public accommodation, covered participants 'in some sport or activity' as well as spectators or
listeners." 45 This recent opinion by the Supreme Court allows the first requirement of a valid
ADA claim to be established by petitioners against the NCAA and sheds new light on how the
courts view the NCAA and its actions.
D. Is Athletics a Property Interest?
The next two characteristics of intercollegiate athletics address the legitimacy of certain
interests. Many claims have been anchored on the fact that participation in intercollegiate
athletics, scholarship money, and the possibility of a future professional athletic career are
property interests in which the Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, provides
protection.46 However, courts have refused to accept this notion since Parish v. NCAA, in which
44 d
45 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). The Supreme Court referred to a previous case (Daniel v. Paul)
that addressed a similar issue regarding a place of public accommodation. "Place of exhibition or entertainment"
and "in some sport or activity" are directly stated in §12181(7), which defines a place of public accommodation in
the ADA statute.
46 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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the Western District Court of Louisiana held that the Constitution does not protect the right to
participate in interscholastic athletic competition.47 This case involved a student-athlete who did
not satisfy the 1.600 rule of eligibility in order to participate in athletics under the NCAA. The
petitioner sought an injunction alleging no due process under the 14 th amendment. The Court
rejected the claim. The Court also outlined the characteristics of a property interest in a
benefit.48 "To have a property interest, a person must have more than an abstract need for it and
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it, but rather the person must have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to the interest."49 Though Parish v. NCAA set the precedent for other
courts, in Hawkins v. NCAA the Central District Court of Illinois addressed the possibility of a
property interest rooted in participation in intercollegiate athletics and the potential for a
professional athletic career.50 In this case, a group of student-athletes challenged a ruling by the
NCAA that imposed sanctions on Bradley University because of infractions that resulted in the
suspension of post-season play stating that they had a legitimate interest in those games because
of the ramifications it may have on their professional careers. The court determined that the
possibility of a professional career is far too speculative based upon performance and the
possibility of an injury to establish a property interest.5 1 The court also agreed with the Parish
opinion and reaffirmed that there is no established right to participate in interscholastic
52
athletics.
Another question that remains is if there is a protected economic interest in an athletic
scholarship to provide for education. Hall v. NCAA addresses this issue, holding that there is no
47 Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. La. 1973).
481 d. at 1228.
49 Id., citing Board of Regents, etc v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
50 Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
51 Id. at 610.
52 Id.
170
protected economic interest in an athletic scholarship.53 The Northern Illinois Federal District
Court explains its reasoning by referring to Knapp v. Northwestern Univ. stating, "while a
college degree enhances one's ability to earn a livelihood, the lack of a scholarship does not
prohibit a person from pursuing a college degree."54 Therefore, the courts have clearly ruled that
student-athletes do not have a property interest in intercollegiate athletic competitions and
athletic scholarships when making due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Does the NCAA Perform a Legitimate Interest?
The final question regarding specific characteristics of the NCAA addressed by the courts
is whether the NCAA has a legitimate purpose in setting up initial academic eligibility rules.
Courts have agreed that that the NCAA has good intentions with the rules that it adopts. 5 In
Hall v. NCAA, the Court noted:
By fostering amateurism and competition within a framework of rules, which
include academic standards, the NCAA's eligibility requirements provide student
athletes with a college experience which goes beyond merely being on a "farm
team for the pros." If the concept of a 'student-athlete' is not to be an oxymoron,
the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements must be more than an afterthought or
an administrative inconvenience for students, teachers, coaches, and counselors. 56
The Eastern Pennsylvania Federal District Court in Cureton v. NCAA stated that the
objective of raising student-athlete graduation rates is a legitimate goal and recognizes that the
NCAA is "properly setting academic standards for student-athletes in hopes of improving the
rate at which they graduate." 57 In Cole v. NCAA, the prevailing view on the NCAA's purpose is
stated as:
The initial-eligibility requirement is also integral to the NCAA's mission of
maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate sports. The purpose of the NCAA's
53 Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
54 Id. at 799, citing Knapp v. Northwestern Univ. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
5 See Hall, 985 F. Supp at 782; Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
56 Hall, 985 F. Supp. at 799.
Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
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academic eligibility requirements is to ensure that students are not merely
admitted to universities to participate in intercollegiate sports, but also are
admitted to promote and develop educational leadership and scholarship.
The opinion goes on to note that eligibility requirements are deemed essential when such
requirements are reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of a particular program.59 The
Court concluded that the NCAA's minimum academic requirements are an essential eligibility
requirement. 60
F. Does the Loss ofParticipation Constitute an Irreparable Harm?
One factor that is brought up in many of the cases, because a preliminary injunction is
sought, is the threat of irreparable harm.61 The courts have at times tackled this issue regarding
the eligibility of student-athletes and at other times have not addressed it at all. In many
preliminary injunction hearings regarding partial-qualifiers seeking their first year of eligibility,
the courts held that the student-athlete suffered no irreparable harm because NCAA bylaw
14.3.3.1 allows a fifth year of schooling to facilitate four years of eligibility.62 However, in
Ganden v. NCAA, the Northern Illinois Federal District Court decided in favor of the student-
athlete on the basis that there was irreparable harm. The student, Ganden, was a world-class
swimmer and without the continuous competition that he could receive as a collegiate swimmer
in the peak time of his career, which in swimming is nineteen to twenty-one years of age, he
would lose a significant portion of his swimming career and inhibit his development during a
" Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1071 (N.D. Ga. 2000). The petitioner claimed that he was discriminated
against due to his learning disability when his standardized test scores and GPA did not meet the requirements of the
NCAA eligibility rules. After resubmission of his application, the student-athlete was declared a partial-qualifier.
59 Id. at 1070.
60 Id. at 1071.
61 The requirements of a preliminary injunction is that the one seeking the injunction is suffering an irreparable harm
and the party has a likelihood of success on the merits.
62 Some examples of cases involving partial qualifiers who were turned away from the court because of this bylaw
are Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000) and Pryor v. NCAA, 153 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
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critical time. 63 In the analogous case of Tatum v. NCAA, the Eastern Missouri Federal District
Court determined that making the student-athlete spend five years in college in order to complete
his four years of eligibility constituted a threat of irreparable harm.64 However, the Court held
that the threat of irreparable harm was outweighed by the fact that the student was already unable
to maintain a sufficient grade point average ("GPA") to remain in good standing academically at
his college. 65 The courts view of the threat of irreparable harm seems to depend upon the facts
of each individual case and therefore no bright-line rule can be laid down. However, as in
Cureton v. NCAA, when the injunctions are appealed they are overturned.66
III. EVOLUTION OF INITIAL ELIGIBILITY RULES
Now that the core characteristics of the NCAA have been established, a brief historical
summary of the eligibility rules will lay a foundation for analyzing the various claims that have
been made against the NCAA. Since the enactment of initial eligibility rules by the NCAA,
there have been gradual changes that have evolved into the standards that the NCAA imposes
now.
In 1986, Proposition 48 went into effect with the goal of raising the graduation rate of
student-athletes. 67 The NCAA set the standard of requiring a 2.0 GPA in 11 core courses (in the
subjects of english, mathematics, natural or physical science, social science, and additional
academic courses approved by the NCAA), demanding a select amount of hours from each of the
disciplines and a 700 Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") score, which was readjusted to 820 when
the SAT altered their scoring scale. If a student-athlete meets both the GPA and the SAT
63 Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17368 at 18 (1996).
64 Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
65 Id. at 1122.
66 Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999).
67 Walter Byers, Executive Director Assesses Status of Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA NEWS, September 22, 1986
at 3.
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requirements, they are deemed "full qualifiers" and could receive athletics scholarships and
participate fully in intercollegiate athletics.68 Those student-athletes who could only meet the
GPA but failed to meet the SAT requirements were deemed "partial qualifiers" and could
practice and receive athletics scholarships but were not allowed to compete in their first year.69
Student-athletes who did not satisfy either requirement were "non-qualifiers" who could not
receive an athletics scholarship and could not participate (compete or practice) with the team on
any level. Proposition 48 was successful in raising the graduation rates of student-athletes, but
the NCAA wanted to see more improvement and therefore enacted a more stringent Proposition
16.70
Proposition 16 became effective in 1996 and changed the face of the eligibility rules
considerably. While the minimum required SAT score remained constant at 820, a student-
athlete would need a 2.5 GPA in order to be a full qualifier.7 ' If a student only had a 2.0 GPA in
their core courses then a SAT score of 1010 was required.72 Thus, the eligibility rules adopted a
sliding scale of SAT scores versus GPA in core courses. The core course requirement was also
raised from 11 to 13 courses.73 The final change was the definition of a "partial qualifier."74 it
was no longer merely just satisfying the 2.0 GPA requirement that allowed you to receive
financial aid and the ability to practice with the team, but rather a new sliding scale was created
that allowed for a low score of 720 on the SAT, but required a 2.75 GPA to match and therefore
68 2004-2005 NCAA Division I Manual 14.3.1.1 at 141 (2004).
69 2001-2002 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.2 at 144 (2001).
70http://www.ncaa.org/databases/reports/1/199810bd/199810_di6bdagenda 
s04c_a.html.
i 2004-2005 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.1.1.1 at 141 (2004).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 2001-2002 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.2 at 144 (2001).
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acted as an extension of the full qualifier scale ranging from 810 (one score below the minimum
full qualifier score) to a low of 720.
In 1999, in the face of a growing amount of litigation initiated by partial qualifiers against
the NCAA, the association adopted an additional bylaw that specifically granted partial qualifiers
five years to utilize their four years of athletics eligibility.76 This new bylaw prevented a
significant amount of litigation from proceeding past summary judgment or motions to dismiss.
Courts often pointed to this bylaw stating that there was no relief to be granted through
injunction because the petitioner will receive four years of athletics participation as well as full
scholarship support.n
Before proceeding to analyzing the nature of the claims against the NCAA, the core
course/GPA and standardized test score requirements need to be examined in order to fully
understand the process of eligibility as well as the nature of the litigation.
The NCAA, through the Clearinghouse, determines what courses are determined to be
"core courses" for the purposes of initial eligibility. The NCAA Clearinghouse was created by
the NCAA to provide a standardized procedure for analyzing the initial eligibility of all
prospective student-athletes. High school students submit their transcripts and test scores to the
Clearinghouse in order to be declared initially eligible for competition and an athletics
scholarship. The procedure has changed many times throughout the years, but generally the
Clearinghouse relies on high school administrators to document, through a specific form, which
courses the school believes to satisfy the core course requirement.7 At times, the Clearinghouse
will contact the administrator of the school to discuss possible problems with some core courses
7 Id.
76 2003-2004 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.3.1 at 148 (2003).
77 Pryor v. NCAA, 153 F. Supp. 710, 712 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
7' Form used by the Clearinghouse is called Form 48-H Confirmation.
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that they believe to be below the NCAA standards and request alternative information, such as
course syllabi and teaching materials. 79 The NCAA, together with the Clearinghouse, have
concrete standards for measuring what the course requirements are for a class to be determined a
"core course." In order for a course to be classified as a "core course" it must satisfy these three
factors: be an academic course in one or a combination of these areas: english, mathematics,
natural/physical science, social science, foreign language, non-doctrinal religion or philosophy;
be four-year college preparatory course; and be at or above your high school's regular academic
level (no remedial, special education, or compensatory courses).s0 A large discrepancy has
occurred in the area of computer science and whether basic word processing and typing skills
suffice to satisfy the "core course" requirement.si Instead of splitting hairs in this highly
controversial area, the NCAA has decided to eliminate all computer science courses from the
"core course" list in 2008.82 The core course GPA requirement has been acknowledged by the
courts for its value as an initial eligibility requirement.83 In Ganden v. NCAA, the Northern
Illinois Federal District Court stated, "the 'core course' criteria further serves the dual interest of
insuring the integrity of [the] GPA and independently insuring that the student has covered the
minimum subject matter required for college." 84
Standardized test score requirements have also been highly criticized by potential
student-athletes through both litigation and the media at large. The new sliding scale seems at
first glance to put more weight on the GPA of the student-athlete in core course requirements.
While the NCAA believes that the new changes puts more of an emphasis on success in the
79 Much of the information in this paragraph is from a dispute in Hall v. NCAA in which a series of discrepancies
between the high school and the Clearinghouse made it somewhat unclear on what the ultimate outcome would be
and eventually the terminations of courses being deemed "core courses" at the high school.
s0 2004-2005 Guide for the College Bound Student-Athlete, NCAA.
si Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 785 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
82 2003-2004 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.3.1 at 142-43 (2003).
Cases include Ganden v. NCAA, Pryor v. NCAA, and Cole v. NCAA.
Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *46 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996).
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classroom versus the SAT or ACT, many courts have agreed with the arguments of petitioners,
who in fact show evidence to the contrary. In Cureton v. NCAA, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals analyzed statistical data and demonstrated that the new changes of Proposition 16
actually resulted in a heavier weight being given to the standardized test score. 85 The Court
stated that the GPA cutoff of 2.00 is set at two standard deviations below the national mean,
while the standardized test cutoff score is only one standard deviation below the national mean. 86
In the recent Pryor v. NCAA decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that,
"Proposition 16 puts a greater emphasis on standardized test score than did its predecessor
(Proposition 48).,87 In a Fair Test article, written by the National Center for Fair and Open
Testing, the author analyzed research regarding the difference between Proposition 48 and
Proposition 16.88 The research showed the lack of necessity for standardized testing to be used
at all in administering eligibility requirements, noting that the service which administers the SAT
has concerns over basing eligibility decisions on small differences in test scores.89
The criticisms made above provide a basis for many of the claims made by student-
athletes against the NCAA throughout the decades. Understanding the history of these claims
and the rulings of the courts that control them may flush out the rationale for future
modifications to the initial eligibility requirements.
Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
86d.
8 Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 553 (3d Cir. 2002).
http://fairtest.org/facts/prop48.htm. The National Center for Fair and Open Testing works to end the misuses and
flaws of standardized testing and to ensure that evaluation of students, teachers, and schools is fair, open, valid and
educationally beneficial.
" http://www.fairtest.org/facts/prop48.htm - throughout the website there are various articles analyzing the use of
test scores and how they are biased towards minorities as well as low-income families.
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IV. CLAIMS AGAINST THE NCAA
Early claims against the NCAA were based on the Fourteenth Amendment and alleged
that student-athletes had an equal protection claim. 90 However, an equal protection claim
requires the plaintiff to show that a particular law, regulation, or statute as applied to a group of
people resulted in discrimination against the plaintiffs. 91 In order to show this, the petitioner
must show that the NCAA is a state actor.92 As discussed earlier, the courts have determined
that the NCAA is not a state actor and therefore not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment.93
Even if the petitioner could satisfy the court that the NCAA is a state actor, they would also have
to prove that playing in intercollegiate athletics and athletics scholarships are fundamental rights
under the Constitution. However, the decisions in Hawkins v. NCAA and Parish v. NCAA made
clear that these actions are not deemed fundamental rights. 94 These same determinations apply
with equal force to § 1983 claims in which the same issues arise.95
Another interesting claim that has arisen from litigation against the NCAA is based on a
breach of contract between the student-athlete and the NCAA through the National Letter of
Intent. The National Letter of Intent "is administered by the Collegiate Commissioners
Association and utilized by all member institutions to establish the commitment of a prospect to
attend a particular institution." 96 In Pryor v. NCAA, the Eastern Pennsylvania Federal District
Court determined that since the student-athlete knowingly entered into a contract with the NCAA
and accepted their conditions and agreed to satisfy them, he cannot claim that they were invalid
) U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Early cases included Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. La. 1973) and
Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
91 Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 606.
92 Id.
93 See supra p. 6 and note 32.
94 See supra p.8 and notes 46-48.
95 Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Examines the same state-actor legal analysis as well as an
analysis of whether athletics and scholarships are fundamental rights according to the judicial systems. The Court
follows strong precedent and comes to the same conclusions as previous cases.
96 2004-2005 NCAA Division I Manual § 13.02.8, at 88 (2004).
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after refusing to comply with the contractual condition of initial eligibility requirements. 97 In
short, since the student-athlete breached the contract first by not complying with the eligibility
requirements of Proposition 16, the contract was invalid and therefore the student could not
enforce any other provisions. 98
Some other claims that resulted in more substantive opinions by the courts include Title
III of the American with Disabilities Act claims and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
claims.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims
While equal protection and contract claims have had no effect upon the eligibility rules
and have resulted in judgments in favor of the NCAA, other claims have been successful; mostly
these are brought by the learning disabled.
Many claims against the NCAA have been initiated by student-athletes who claim to
have a learning disability and thus argue for a waiver of the eligibility requirements. 99 Any
student-athlete may apply for a waiver of the eligibility requirements citing certain learning
disabilities or other reasons that may have caused the ineligible test score or GPA. The NCAA
refuses most of these waiver requests, but student-athletes with learning disabilities are often
granted eligibility as partial qualifiers. In cases where the student-athlete claims a learning
disability, they primarily rely upon Title III of the American with Disabilities Act as their legal
basis.100 Title III prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the full and fair enjoyment
of any place of public accommodations owned, leased, or operated by private entities.101 In
Pryor v. NCAA, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
98 Id.
99 Some cases include: Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *19 (N.D. Ill. 1996),
Tatum v. NCAA and Cole v. NCAA.
1042 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
101 Id.
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Ganden v. NCAA, the Northern Illinois Federal District Court outlined what is needed for the
plaintiff to succeed in a Title III claim:
A plaintiff must prove: (1) he is disabled; (2) that the defendant is a 'private
entity' which owns, leases or operates a 'place of public accommodation'; (3) the
eligibility requirements 'screened' him out of NCAA certification on the basis of
his disability and those requirements were not 'necessary for the provision' of the
'accommodation' or he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit
from services or accommodations on the basis of his disability and the defendant
failed to make reasonable modifications which would not fundamentally alter the
nature of the public accommodation.' 02
As noted before the courts have determined for the use of Title III claims that the NCAA
operates a place of public accommodation. 03 The Ganden v. NCAA opinion also noted that
Congress, when forming Title III of the ADA, recognized that discrimination on the basis of
disability is often a product of thoughtlessness and indifference rather than direct discriminatory
intent. 104 Consequently, the statute focuses more on the inquiry as to whether the defendant has
provided a reasonable accommodation of the individual based upon knowledge of the plaintiffs
disability. 10
The next question is whether the NCAA made reasonable modifications to facilitate the
student-athletes disability. The Ganden Court cited Pottgen v. Missouri State High School
Activities Ass'n, which stated that "under each provision, a modification is unreasonable if it
imposes an 'undue financial and administrative burden' or requires a 'fundamental alteration' in
the nature of the privilege or program." 06 The Ganden Court believed that the waiver
application process instituted by the NCAA and the individualized consideration that is part of
102 Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *19 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
103 See supra p. 8.
104 Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
105 Id.
106 Id. at *42 (citing Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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that process satisfies a reasonable modification under Title 111.107 The Court went on to note that
lowering the minimum GPA requirements for students with learning disabilities would remove
the "NCAA's primary objective tool to determine a student's academic capabilities."1os By
lowering the minimum GPA requirements, it would take a tool away from the NCAA in their
attempts to raise student-athlete graduation rates. Cole v. NCAA further bolsters the Court's
opinion in Ganden when stating that "eligibility requirements are deemed 'essential' or
'necessary' when such requirements are reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes of a
particular program." 109
Most learning disability cases have been considered a non-issue by the courts because of
NCAA bylaw 14.3.3.1, which allow partial qualifiers to have five years of academic support to
complete their fourth year of athletic eligibility.1 10 The NCAA through its waiver request
process often granted these learning disabled student-athletes status as a partial qualifier. This
grant of eligibility makes any case against the NCAA a non-issue because no injunctive relief
can be granted by the judicial system and monetary damages are not a lawful form of relief in
ADA claims.
A showing of learning disability is usually not an issue in cases against the NCAA
because of the proper documentation, but the judicial system has encountered cases that raise
learning disability as a significant issue. In Tatum v. NCAA, the student-athlete realized in the
fall of his senior year that he was not going to achieve the required standardized test scores to
satisfy the eligibility requirements and therefore sought out a psychologist to determine that he
107 Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *48 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
108 Id.
109 Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1070-71 (N.D. Ga. 2000). The Ganden opinion stated that the waiver
process was a reasonable modification for the eligibility requirements and reaffirmed that the eligibility
requirements were necessary to accomplish the goals of the NCAA. Therefore, the eligibility requirements are
deemed essential by Cole because they are reasonable necessary to accomplish the purposes of the program.
10 2004-2005 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.3.1, at 150 (2004).
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had a learning disability, which would allow non-standard test scores to be accepted by the
NCAA.111 After one psychologist did not find the student-athlete to be learning disabled, he
sought out another opinion, after which it was concluded that the student suffered from
generalized anxiety disorder, which was not recognized by the NCAA as a learning disability. 112
As a prospective student-athlete, his application for an eligibility waiver was denied.1 3 The
Eastern Missouri Federal District Court agreed with the NCAA and stated that there is evidence
that the petitioner's poor performance in school and on the SAT was due to lack of motivation or
preparation.114 Tatum makes it abundantly clear that the judicial system is not willing to merely
skip to the other elements of the Title III claim by deferring to claims of student-athletes. This
ruling stops frivolous disability claims from evolving by discouraging the possibility that
student-athletes will seek out a learning disability when they in fact do not suffer from one.
B. Civil Rights Act of 1964 Claim
Another major claim in initial eligibility lawsuits is under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 15 To establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination under Title VI a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant is a recipient of federal funds that intentionally discriminated
against the petitioner.116 The NCAA is determined not to be a recipient of federal funds for the
purpose of establishing eligibility rules.117 An allegation will succeed if the petitioner can show
that the defendant had a discriminatory motive for their actions. The standard for measuring
discriminatory motive is that "the policy must be adopted 'because of not merely 'in spite of,'
... Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (E.D. Mo.1998).
112dat 1
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1123.
115 42 U.S.C. § 200d (1964).
116 Pryor v. NCAA, 153 F. Supp. 2d a710, 715-16 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
11 See supra pp. 4-5.
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its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."118 The Eastern Pennsylvania District Court in
Pryor v. NCAA, stated that the "defendant's awareness or even acceptance of a particular effect
does not raise its conduct to the level of purposeful discrimination."1 9 The Court went on to
note that Proposition 16 is a facially neutral policy that is purely motivated by the desire to
improve the graduation rate of all student-athletes.120 The Court, therefore, came to the
conclusion that Proposition 16 occurred "in spite of' rather than "because of' an alleged
disparate impact on African-Americans.121
Other plaintiffs have sought relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that the
NCAA was deliberately indifferent to the disparate impact of Proposition 16.122 These claims
have been rejected by the courts that cite the Supreme Court case Alexander v. Sandoval, which
states, "where a federally funded entity knowingly adopts or implements regulations that create a
racially or ethnically disparate impact, Title VI does not afford a remedy." 123 There have been
decisions that have viewed the facts strongly in favor of the plaintiff in light of summary
judgment motions that have determined that the NCAA is a federally-funded entity and there is
enough evidence of purposeful discrimination.124 However, despite passing the trial court's
assessment during the NCAA's summary judgment motion, these rulings and arguments have
not stood up in the Court of Appeals or any other proceedings where the facts are not viewed in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party. 125
1is Pryor v. NCAA, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979)).
119 Id. at 716-17.
120 at 717.
121 id
122 Such cases include Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 117 (3rd Cir. 1999) and Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782,
799 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
123 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
124 Most notably in student-athlete eligibility cases: Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
125 Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999). The appellate review of Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687
(E.D. Pa. 1999).
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One case that came down in favor of the petitioner when the plaintiff filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment was Cureton v. NCAA. 126 This ruling briefly enjoined the
implementation of Proposition 16 by the NCAA until the ruling was overturned in the Court of
Appeals. 127 Even though this ruling was overturned and the injunction was lifted, Cureton may
have left a more permanent impact on the initial eligibility rules because of its brief success.
In Cureton, the student-athletes brought a Title VI claim and successfully argued to the
court that the NCAA was intentionally discriminating on the basis of race. The first issue that
arose was whether the NCAA is a federally funded program and therefore covered under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs argued that the NYSP Fund was an "alter ego" of
the NCAA and therefore made the NCAA a directly federally funded program.128 The Court
agreed with this argument but also went on to say that the NCAA is subject to suit under Title VI
because its "member schools (who themselves indisputably receive federal funds) have ceded
controlling authority over federally funded programs to the NCAA." 129 This ruling by the
District Court in Cureton overrules precedent set by the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Tarkanian,
which, as discussed earlier, ruled that the NCAA acts more like a private actor than a state actor
and that membership in the NCAA is strictly voluntary and there are other options for
universities.130 However, since the Cureton Court determined that the NCAA was a federally
funded entity, the analysis continued to the alleged discrimination.
The Court also allowed an argument for disparate impact discrimination under Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., which held that a plaintiff does not necessarily need to prove intentional
126 Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
127 Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
128 Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
129 d
" See supra pp. 4-5.
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discrimination in order to establish a violation of Title VII.13 1 The Court also cited Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, which held that a "plaintiff must initially demonstrate that the application
of a specific facially neutral selection practice has caused an adverse disproportionate effect"
excluding the plaintiff from an educational opportunity. 132 The petitioners showed this
discrimination through statistical proof, which "can alone make out a prima facie case."1 33 The
Court persuaded by the statistical evidence, found that Proposition 16 excluded African-
Americans at a rate that was disproportionate to the exclusion of whites. 134
Once the plaintiffs successfully proved discrimination, the burden shifted to the
defendants to prove that the disproportionate effect is justified by an "educational necessity."135
The Court acknowledged that the raising of student-athlete graduation rates is a legitimate
educational goal and the setting of academic standards is an appropriate method of doing so.136
However, the Court required a showing from the NCAA of a "manifest relationship" between the
use of particular cutoff scores of the standardized tests and its goal of raising graduation rates.137
The NCAA failed to satisfy the Cureton Court's inquiry. The opinion recognized that the scores
accepted are only one standard deviation below the national mean while the GPA requirement is
two standards below. The NCAA attempted to produce evidence that its decision to choose the
820 cutoff score was reasonably manifested to the goal. The Court rejected all of the NCAA's
arguments and stated that the 820 cutoff score must be shown to be reasonable and consistent
with normal expectations of the acceptable proficiency of student-athletes towards attaining a
Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
132 Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642, 656-57 (1989)).
133 Id. (see 490 U.S. at 650-55).
134 Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 699-700.
135 Id. at 697.
136 Id. at 703.
1 Id. at 706.
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college degree.' 38 The NCAA failed this test and therefore the Court went on to address the final
issue of whether there are equally effective alternative practices to Proposition 16.
V. ALTERNATIVES To PROPOSITION 16
In order for a plaintiff to be successful in a Title VI Civil Rights claim, they have to
prove that there are viable alternatives to Proposition 16.139 The plaintiff in Cureton produced
three viable alternatives, all of which were accepted as effective methods by the Court.140 The
plaintiff provided statistical data showing the anticipated graduation rate and the potential
positive effect on the disproportionate impact on minorities.141 The first alternative was to
eliminate the distinction of partial-qualifiers, thereby lowering the minimum score needed to be a
full-qualifier. 142 The second alternative included the elimination of partial qualifiers but also
extended the sliding scale down to a 600 SAT score.143 The third alternative, which would have
the biggest impact on the discriminatory effect, adopted a full sliding scale that would eliminate
a minimum standardized score and minimum GPA in favor of a system based solely on a test
score/GPA combination score.144 This would result in an equally weighted scale of grades and
standardized test scores to determine eligibility.145
Despite the plaintiff s success on their cross-motion for summary judgment, each of these
conclusions was rejected in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court decided that the
NCAA was not federally funded and therefore not subject to Title VI because "the regulations,
like the statute, are program specific," in regards to the NYSP Fund. 146 When addressing the
"s Id. at 709-10.
139 42 U.S.C. § 200d (1964).






146 Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 1999).
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funding through member schools of the NCAA, the Court noted that the critical inquiry in
determining if an entity is an indirect recipient of federal funds is if the entity was the intended
recipient of the federal funds according to Congress.147 Clearly, when the government gives
federal assistance to colleges and universities they have not "earmarked" an amount of funds to
be paid to the NCAA for membership dues. 148 Since the student-athletes could no longer prove
that the NCAA was federally funded, the rest of their argument was unnecessary to consider.
VI. IMPACT OF THE LAWSUITS ON THE NCAA ELIGIBILITY BYLAWS
Despite this apparent defeat for the plaintiffs, Cureton has had an impact on the
upcoming changes in the initial eligibility requirements. In August of 2005, the NCAA will
adopt a full-sliding scale that reaches a low SAT score of 400 and a corresponding high GPA of
3.550 and above while retaining the minimum GPA of 2.00 and a corresponding 1010 SAT
score. This full sliding scale also eliminates partial-qualifier status.149 However, the full-range
sliding scale is accompanied by a requirement of 14 core courses, which will be raised in 2008 to
16 core courses.15 0 These changes directly correspond to the alternatives suggested to in Cureton
v. NCAA. This is a clear sign that the NCAA hopes to prevent further litigation on the matter
and make disproportionate impact a non-issue. Further evidence that the Cureton opinion had a
definite impact on the new initial eligibility rules is that they were created and voted upon by the
members before the district court decision was overruled.
Clearly, the NCAA adopted these new eligibility rules to fend off future litigation raising
the same claims that Cureton made. However, this is not the first time that the NCAA has
147 Id. at 116.
148 The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) fell in line with the NCAA
v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988) decision and stated that the NCAA is not a state actor.
149 2003-2004 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.3.1, at 141 (2003).
150 2003-2004 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.3.1 at 143 (2003).
1' Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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enacted legislation in reaction to judicial activity. The adoption of bylaw 14.3.3.1, allowing
partial qualifiers a fifth academic year to complete their academic eligibility, was a reaction to a
line of cases involving partial qualifiers seeking the status of a full-qualifier. 15 2 This bylaw
eliminated any relief that could be granted by injunction by allowing the full amount of athletic
participation, just at a delayed rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the NCAA's success will the litigation from non-qualifying students will subside
with the enactment of the full-sliding scale combining GPA and standardized test scores?
Though the new eligibility requirements allow for greater flexibility and should allow more
student-athletes to be deemed eligible, there will always be a student who does not meet the
requirements and feel as if an injustice has been done, prompting arguments for a more lenient
eligibility structure. The NCAA has shut off much of the litigation through the court's
determination that they are not a federally funded program and therefore not covered under a
myriad of federal statutes. 153 This protection can be eliminated by the ruling in one case or a
change in the structure of the NCAA. Even though these new eligibility requirements will
provide a narrower opportunity for litigation against the NCAA, there are still issues in dispute.
Many people argue that standardized test scores should not be utilized at all because they are bias
against low-income households, as well as minorities and women.154 The new sliding scale
combines specific GPAs and standardized test scores and a reworking of the corresponding
values in each could be the basis for new litigation.
152 2004-2005 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.3.3.1 at 150 (2004). Cases include: Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782,
799 (N.D. Ill. 1997), Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17368 (1996), and Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d
1060, 1071 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
153 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) and Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
154 http://fairtest.org/facts.
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The NCAA's goal in regards to the administration of its initial-eligibility requirements is
to raise the student-athlete graduation rate. It has succeeded with record highs. The first class to
graduate under Proposition 16 had a 62% graduation rate, higher than any class before it.'5 5 The
enactment of the full-sliding scale, effective in 2005, seems like a step back from the rigidity of
Proposition 16. Though, the true impact will not be measured until many years from now, this
step back seems to be a result of the litigation that the NCAA is fighting every year. This
preventive measure against future litigation, will most likely not be successful. The United
States is a litigious country and many believe that they are entitled to things that they have not
earned.
The NCAA and its eligibility requirements are by no means perfect or thoroughly
righteous and there are valid problematic issues that can be extracted out of the new changes,
which rely on arguments of discrimination in the use of the SAT and the attempt of using a scale
to balance out one's GPA with their test score. However, it can be argued that the changes allow
for too much flexibility and put too much responsibility in the hands of high school teachers and
administrators, who have shown through the adjustment of grades and other techniques, the
willingness to cheat to get a student a scholarship instead of working with them from the start, so
that the student-athlete is not only a star athlete for the school, but can also compete in the
academic setting as well.
Instead of worrying so much about the NCAA initial eligibility rules, we should be more
concerned about the way our secondary schools are operated. These schools are supposed to be
adequately educating and preparing kids to move on to college or the working world. From the
facts of the cases discussed in this paper, it is obvious that many of these schools are letting kids
155 NCAA Division I Garduation Rates Rise to 62 Percent; Increase Attributed to Increased Eligibility Standards,
http://ncaa.org/releases/research/200309020 1re.ltm.
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slide by and the educational system, as a whole, needs a massive reform. The Manhattan
Institute conducted a study that analyzed the percentage of students who received a high-school
diploma and were academically prepared for college academics.156 According to their
calculations 710% of the class of 2002 graduated with a regular diploma, yet only 34% graduated
with the abilities and qualifications to apply to a four-year college. '57 This study demonstrates
that our current high school system is in need of desperate reform. While the performance of our
elementary school students is strong compared with international averages, our high school
students rank near the bottom. The Manhattan Institute concluded that if America wants
increased success and participation in college then the education received at the high school level
must improve to facilitate that opportunity.159 As revealed in the media often, this improvement
must start with teachers, who can not allow a child to get a passing grade without truly learning
the material. According to a 1998 National Assessment of Education Progress report, the
average minority high school graduate performs at the same level as an 8 th grade white student in
reading and mathematics. 160 This type of discrepancy can not continue to exist. The NCAA and
its member institutions attempt to provide opportunities for those who are unable financially to
attend college through the use of athletics scholarships, but the NCAA can not be held
accountable for the lack of performance by teachers and administrators in high schools
throughout the country.
Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, Public High School Graduation and College Readiness Rate, Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research, http://manhattan-institute.org/html/ewp_08.htm The Manhattan Institute is a think
tank whose mission is to develop and disseminate new ideas that foster greater economic choice and individual
responsibility.
157 Id. To calculate the college-readiness rate they used a graduation rate calculation, a minimum level of academic
course work based upon four-year public colleges, and a nationally respected standardized reading assessment test.
15s http://ecs.org/html/issue.asp?issuelD=108. This article was published by the Education Commission of the States
(ECS), which is an interstate compact created in 1965 to improve public education by facilitating the exchange of
information, ideas, and experiences among state policymakers and education leasers.
159 Id.
160 High School, http://ecs.org/html/issue.asp?issuelD=108.
190
The NCAA initial eligibility standards will never be full-proof in determining the success
of student-athletes in the classroom. The NCAA can only hope to give eligible student-athletes
the chance to succeed in the classroom. Continued litigation and therefore reactive changes in
the initial eligibility requirements may lead to a downturn in graduation rates from the highs the
NCAA experienced with the success of Proposition 16. The NCAA is trying to fight this trend
with the enactment of the Academic Performance Program, which gives incentives to member
institutions to recruit individuals who will remain academically eligible and graduate in five
years. 161 This program provides the NCAA with another tool it can use against a graduation rate
drop and puts the onus on the member institutions to recruit student-athletes who will not only
satisfy the initial eligibility requirements, but also students who will succeed in the college
classroom. The NCAA has good intentions and the ultimate success of their student-athletes in
the game of life in mind when creating these requirements. At times, this goodwill is forgotten
by the student-athletes turned away and the public at-large.
161 Gary T. Brown, APR 101: Implementation of Penalty Structure Triggers New Terminology, Consequences,
Questions, NCAA NEWS, February 14, 2005, at 1.
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